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Casenote

Deductibility of Rental Payments
Where Reversion Is Retained
In Gift, Leaseback Arrangement
C. James Mathews, 61 T.C. 12 (1973)
For the high-income bracket taxpayer seeking to reduce his tax
burden, a gift and leaseback can be a valuable device for reallocat-2
ing income within the family.' To utilize this tax-saving tool,
the taxpayer transfers business property to a trustee in short-term
trust for his dependents or other beneficiaries, taking care that
the trust income is not used to discharge any legal obligation of
the taxpayer.3 By a simultaneous agreement, the trustee leases
the property back to the taxpayer for use in his business. The
taxpayer then may take a business expenses deduction under section 162 (a) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code ("Code") for the
rental payments made to the trustee, while the rental income is
split among the lower income brackets of the beneficiaries. When
the trust terminates, the property may either be conveyed to the
beneficiaries or to a third party, or, as occurred in C. James Mathews,4 revert to the taxpayer. This note will consider whether
1. For an illustration of possible savings offered by a gift and leaseback, see CCH 1974 STAm. FED. TAX REP. f 259.12. Advantages of
the gift and leaseback include the opportunity to use otherwise

"locked-in" assets for tax savings with a minimal disruption of business relationships. For the professional with few capital assets, the
gift and leaseback may be a practical method to split income. See

Simmons, New Developments in the "Gift and Leaseback" in Tax
Planningfor the Professional,51 TAXES 654 (1973).
2. Closely related forms of leaseback transactions not discussed in this
Note include a transfer of property by absolute gift and a transfer
of cash to a trustee who purchases the property to be leased to the

taxpayer. See, e.g., White v. Fitzpatrick, 193 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1951);
Helen C. Brown, 12 T.C. 1095 (1949), rev'd, 180 F.2d 926 (3d Cir.),

cert. denied, 340 U.S. 814 (1950). The taxpayer may also use a sale
and leaseback. See, e.g., Albert T. Felix, 21 T.C. 794 (1954).
3. Any part of the trust income actually used to discharge the taxpayer's
legal obligations would be taxed as income to the taxpayer. INT.
REV. CODE OF 1954, § 677.
4. P-H TAX CT. RE'. & MxAf.DEC. 1 61.3, at 61-7 (1973). Appeal filed
by the Internal Revenue Service, P-H 1974 FED. TAxES
60,112, at

60,168.

304

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 53, NO. 2 (1974)

the taxpayer who retains a reversion may be denied a deduction
for the rental payments made during the term of the trust.
Not surprisingly, the gift and leaseback arrangement has met
substantial resistance from the Internal Revenue Service 5 and has
been the subject of considerable litigation,6 the results of which
have created confusion about what the taxpayer must do to utilize
this type of trust.7

The problem arises because no provision of

the Code speaks specifically to the gift and leaseback situation.
Sections 671 to 678, the so-called Clifford provisions, determine only
when the grantor of a short-term trust will be taxed on the trust
income.8 Therefore, to determine when the taxpayer may take a
deduction for rents paid to the trustee, the courts have had to
proceed on a case by case basis under section 162(a) (3).
Section 162 of the Code provides:
(a) In General.-There shall be allowed as a deduction all the
ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business, including(3) rentals or other payments required to be made as a condition to the continued use or possession, for purposes of the
trade or business, of property to which the taxpayer has not
taken or is not taking title or in which he has no equity.
The bulk of gift and leaseback decisions has focused on whether
rents paid to the trustee were actually "necessary" and "required."9
For rents to qualify, the courts have usually required the taxpayer
to show one or more of the following: relinquishment by the taxpayer of effective control of the property to the trustee; 10 indepen5. In 1973, the Internal Revenue Service listed the gift and leaseback
as a "prime issue" to be litigated rather than settled. INT. REV. SERVICE MANUAL, MT-1277-6 (Jan. 1, 1973).
6. For a general review of earlier gift and leaseback litigation, see Ol-

iver, Income Tax Aspects of Gifts and Leasebacks of Business Property in Trust, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 21, 25-30 (1965).

For later cases, see

Fiore, New Possibilitiesand Old Pitfalls in Irrevocable Living Trusts,
111 TRUSTS & ESTATES 8 (1972).
7. See notes 9-14 and accompanying text infra.
8. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 671-78.
9. See Brooke v. United States, 468 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1972); Audano
v. United States, 428 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1970); Van Zandt v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 440 (5th Cir. 1965); Brown v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d
926 (3d Cir. 1950); Skemp v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir.
1948); Duffy v. United States, 343 F. Supp. 4 (S.D. Ohio 1972); Chace
v. United States, 303 F. Supp. 513 (M.D. Fla. 1969).
10. See, e.g., Brooke v. United States, 468 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1972); Van
Zandt v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1965); Skemp v. Com-

missioner, 168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948); Chace v. United States, 303

TAXATION
dence of the trustee;" reasonableness of rental payments;1 2 observation of certain formalities; 13 and a discernible business purpose
for the transactions.' 4 But the question of whether the taxpayer
had a disqualifying "equity" interest as provided in section 162
(a) (3) has been litigated less frequently. Obviously, the taxpayer
who has completely divested himself of the trust property by giving the remainder interest to a third party has no "equity." When
the taxpayer has retained a reversion in himself, however, there
has been uncertainty whether such an interest was a prohibited
"equity" sufficient in itself to deny the rental deduction.15 In C.
F. Supp. 513 (M.D. Fla. 1969); Jack Wiles, 59 T.C. 289 (1972); Sidney
W. Penn, 51 T.C. 144 (1968).
11. See Brooke v. United States, 468 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1972) (taxpayer

12.

13.

14.

15.

as a court appointed guardian deemed independent); Van Zandt v.
Commissioner, 341 F.2d 440 (5th Cir. 1965) (taxpayer acting as
trustee denied a rent deduction); Duffy v. United States, 343 F. Supp.
4 (S.D. Ohio 1972) (bank held independent trustee); Robert F. Zumstein, 32 CCH TAX CT. MEm. 198 (1973) (lack of independence of
trustee who failed to enforce lease requirements); Jack Wiles, 59 T.C.
289 (1972) (taxpayer acting as trustee denied rental deduction); Alden B. Oakes, 44 T.C. 524 (1965) (bank trustee held independent).
See Audano v. United States, 428 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1970); Brown
v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 926 (3d Cir. 1950); Skemp v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948). Rent can be a factor in disallowing deductions whether unreasonably low, see Chace v. United
States, 303 F. Supp. 513 (M.D. Fla. 1969), or unreasonably high, see
Kirschenmann v. United States, 225 F.2d 69 (9th Cir. 1955).
See, e.g., Audano v. United States, 428 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1970) (lack
of written lease); Brown v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 926 (3d Cir. 1950)
(valid trust instrument, valid lease); Skemp v. Commissioner, 168
F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948) (valid trust instrument, valid lease); Duffy
v. United States, 343 F. Supp. 4 (S.D. Ohio 1972) (valid deed, written lease); Jack Wiles, 59 T.C. 289 (1972) (deduction denied where
rent arrangement was informal); Sidney W. Penn, 51 T.C. 144 (1968)
(deduction denied, no written lease).
Van Zandt v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 440 (5th Cir. 1965). But see
Alden B. Oakes, 44 T.C. 524 (1965). Each of the factors examined
by the courts naturally overlaps. Discussion of the courts' examination of gift and leasebacks may be found in Note, Tax Consequences
of an Intrafamily Transfer of Business Property Into Trust For Dependents With a Leaseback By the Grantor's Business, 73 CoLumV. L.
REv. 1420 (1973); Note, Gift and Leaseback-Tax Planning In the
Shadows of Assignment of Income and Business Purpose, 62 GEo. L.J.
209 (1973); Gift and Leaseback: A Continuing Tax Controversy, 4
LoYoLA U.L.J. 371 (1973).
See Thomas B. Gibbons, 25 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1332 (D.N.M. 1970)
(deduction disallowed because taxpayer's reversionary interest was
held to be a prohibited equity); Chace v. United States, 303 F. Supp.
513 (M.D. Fla. 1969) (deduction disallowed; opinion open to the interpretation that a reversionary interest is an "equity"); Hall v. United
States, 208 F. Supp. 584 (N.D.N.Y. 1962) (deduction disallowed; alternate holding that a reversion is an "equity"); Alden B. Oakes, 44
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James Mathews,16 this previously subordinate issue became central,
and in a a somewhat unexpected decision, the Tax Court held that
a mere reversion, not derived from the lease or the lessor, which
will become possessory only after the lease expires, is not a disqualifying "equity" interest under section 162 (a) (3).
The taxpayer in Mathews was a funeral director in St. Petersburg, Florida, who, with his wife, owned the property on which
the funeral home was located. In 1961, the petitioner and his wife
transferred this property by warranty deed to their attorney in
irrevocable trust for their children for ten years and one day, at
which time the trust corpus was to revert to the grantors or their
estates. By a simultaneous, prearranged transaction, the petitioner
leased the property from the trustee and continued to operate the
premises as a funeral home.' 7 Under a subsequent lease, the taxpayer had the option to renew his lease from year to year under
terms agreeable to both parties. The commissioner disallowed the
taxpayer's rental deductions for 1964 and 1965, and for the period
from January 1 to May 23, 1966, at which time the taxpayer and
his wife had relinquished their reversionary interests in the property. The court found that under the particular facts of the case,
the taxpayer had met all the requirements set out in prior cases
for showing the business necessity of the rental payment.' 8 In
so finding, the court was squarely faced with the issue of whether
Mathews' reversion came within the equity provision of section
162 (a) (3).
T.C. 524 (1965) (dictum, a reversion is an "equity"). Even in cases
where the equity provision had not been specifically invoked, a taxpayer with a reversionary interest had never been granted a deduction. See, e.g., Van Zandt v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 440 (5th Cir.
1965). The consensus of tax planning advice at the time of Mathews
was that a reversionary interest in the taxpayer would be fatal to
his gift and leaseback plan. See Fiore, supra note 6; Simmons, supra
note 1; Estate Planning Through Family Bargaining,8 REAL PROPERT',
PROBATE & TRUSTS J. 223, 238 (Summer 1973).
16. P-H TAx CT. REP. & AMm. DEC. 61.3, at 61-7 (1973).
17. The terms of the first lease were not discussed by the court.
18. These requirements as seen by the Tax Court were three:
1. The grantor must not retain "'substantially the same control over the property that he had before' he made the
gift." P-H TAx CT. REP. & MEVI. DEC. 1 61.3, at 61-7,
-10 (1973), quoting Sidney W. Penn, 51 T.L. 144, 150 (1968).
This was interpreted by the court to mean in essence that
the property had been transferred to an "independent"
trustee having the right and opportunity to negotiate the
lease and who acts primarily on behalf of the beneficiaries.
Mathews' attorney was found to be such an "independent"
trustee. Id. at 61-11.
2. The rent must be reasonable and paid under a written
1qase. Id,

TAXATION
Defining "equity" as used in section 162 (a) (3) was no simple
task. The prohibition of rental deductions for property in which
the lessee has taken or is taking title or in which he has an
"equity" interest first appeared in the Code in 1916.19 It was apparently intended to close a tax loophole which had allowed mortgagors to take "rent" deductions on the grounds that mortgage
payments were necessary for "continued use and possession" of
the property. 20 The language adopted by Congress is obviously
much broader than the situation which is said to have prompted
it. 21 Yet "equity" is not defined by the statute, nor has it ever
been clarified by regulation.
In general legal parlance, "equity" would be defined as "a right
of redemption, a reversionary interest, a right to specific performance, or in general any right respecting property which traditionally would have been enforceable by means of an equitable remedy."122 The Tax Court in dictum in Alden B. Oakes had previously
cited this definition in support of its opinion that a reversion in
a gift and leaseback would per se be a disqualifying "equity" interest. The Mathews court, however, followed the lead of some
commentators 23 in noting that this definition, if taken literally,
would lead to anomalous tax results. 24 It would of necessity preclude deductions by lessees in a wide variety of common business
rental situations. For example, a remainderman renting from a
life tenant, or a tenant in common renting his co-tenant's interest
to secure sole use of the property, would each have a prohibited
"equity" within this broad meaning.25 Presuming that Congress
3. The leaseback must have a bona fide business purpose.
The court found that Mathews had satisfied this require-

ment in that he needed the building for his funeral business and had paid a reasonable rent as a condition to the
continued use of the property. - Id.

19. Revenue Act of 1916, § 12(a) (1st), 39 STAT. 756, 767 (1916).
20. 4 A. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATioN § 25.108 (rev. ed.

1972); Froelich, Clifford Trusts: Use of PartnershipInterests as Cor-

pus; Leaseback Arrangements, 52 CALiF. L. REv. 956, 975 n.74 (1964).
21. No explanation for the particular wording is offered by either the
Senate or House Report. S. REP. No. 793, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1916);

H.R. REP. No. 922, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1916).
22. Alden B. Oakes, 44 T.C. 524, 531 (1965); see 61 T.C. 12, P-H TAX CT.
REP. & M.im. DEC. 61.3, at 61-7, -11 (1973).
23. See Froelich, supra note 20, at 974-75. "
24. Indeed, as the court notes, applied in its most literal sense, no lessee

would ever be entitled to a deduction, as every lessee has the right
to specific performance of terms of the lease. P-H TAX CT. REP.
MiEm. DEC. [ 61.3, at 61-7, -12 (1973).
25. P-H TAX CT. REP. & MiEm. DEC.
61.3, at 61-7, -12 (1973).
See
Froelich, supra note 20, at 976.
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could not have intended such sweeping tax consequences, the Tax
Court sought a narrower definition of "equity."
The court relied primarily on an analogy to the lease-purchase
situation, in which the lessee pays a specified periodic "rent" and
later acquires title upon payment of an option price. Under such
an arrangement, the lessee has been held to have a disqualifying
"equity" if, in light of all the circumstances existing at the time
of the contract, it appears that the lessee's payments have been
purchasing not only the use and possession of the property but
an ownership interest as well.2( These cases have thus interpreted
"equity" in its business sense to mean a capital investment by one
27
who has not yet acquired full ownership.
The Mathews court agreed that the "equity" disqualification
could fairly be applied to the lease-purchase case, reasoning that
there is no injustice in denying a deduction for a payment which
is not for the temporary use of land, but is actually adding to
an ownership interest. When the deduction is denied, the payment
is not lost to the taxpayer; rather it can be capitalized to reflect
fairly the sale transaction which has actually occurred. On the
other hand, rental payments made by a gift and leaseback taxpayer
with a reversionary interest do not enlarge the taxpayer's ownership interest. If denied as deductions, they could not be capitalized
and would be lost entirely to the taxpayer. Likewise, a reversioner
subleasing from the holder of a ninety-nine year lease and the
owner of an undivided interest renting from his co-owner do not
increase their ownership interests through their rental payments.
Viewing these situations as indistinguishable from each other, and
deeming it unfair to disallow the deduction in every such case,
the court determined that it could not disallow the deduction in
the gift and leaseback case. The conclusion of the court was that
a disqualifying "equity" does not include a lessee's ownership
rights held concurrently with, but not derived from, the
lessor's
28
property rights or enlarged through the rental payments.
While the court's opinion was based on unelaborated concepts
of "fairness," its ultimate finding that a reversionary interest is
not per se an "equity" within section 162(a) (3) appears justified.
The objection might be raised that the court's decision places the
26. E.g., M & W Gear Co. v. Commissioner, 446 F.2d 841 (7th Cir. 1971),
modifying 54 T.C. 385 (1970); Benton v. Commissioner, 197 F.2d 745
(5th Cir. 1952); Chicago Stoker Corp., 14 T.C. 441 (1950); Judson Mills,
11 T.C. 25 (1948).

27. See Johnson, Lessee Improvements to Leased Property and Option
to Purchase,N.Y.U. 12TH INST. ON FED. TAx 75, 89-90 (1954).
28. P-H TAx CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. 61.3, at 61-7, -13 (1973).

TAXATION
taxpayer on par with the "ordinary" lessee, when in fact the taxpayer receives benefits which the "ordinary" lessee does not. Each
year that passes, the taxpayer's reversionary interest becomes proportionately more valuable to the taxpayer until the end of the
trust term, when, of course, one hundred per cent of its value
is again his. Furthermore, a part of the rental payments may be
used for general upkeep 29 or to maintain insurance on property
in which the taxpayer will soon have a full interest. In addition,
at the end of the term, the taxpayer will probably have the added
benefit of substantially appreciated property. It could be argued
that this accumulaton of benefits represents a present 30 "equity"
which should operate to disallow the taxpayer's deduction.
The Tax Court made no mention of the taxpayer's position relative to the "ordinary" lessee. Nevertheless, the same considerations which led the court to hold that a reversion viewed as a
future interest is not a disqualifying "equity" apply to the reversion viewed as a present interest. The court noted that in the
lease-purchase situation any benefits associated with an ownership
interest in the property derive from and continue to depend upon
the taxpayer's "rental" payments. The court contrasted this with
the taxpayer in the gift and leaseback situation who does not increase his ownership interest through his payments.3 1 Recognizing
29. If a portion of the trust income is used to make extraordinary improvements, it could be taxed as income to the taxpayer under § 677
(a) of the Code:
GENERAL RuLE.-The grantor shall be treated as the owner
of any portion of a trust, whether or not he is treated as
such owner under section 674, whose income without the approval or consent of any adverse party is, or, in the discretion
of the grantor or a nonadverse party, or both, may be(2) held or accumulated for future distribution to the
grantor or the grantor's spouse;
30. See Note, Gift and Leaseback-Tax Planning In the Shadows of Assignment of Income and Business Purpose, 62 GEo. L.J. 209, 225 n.114
(1973).
31. P-H TAX CT. REP. & MEm. DEC.
61.3, at 61-7, -13 (1973). Mathews'
funeral home was apparently subject to a mortgage. The record did
not indicate whether the trustee was making principal payments.
Since the Commissioner did not contend that Mathews was building
up "equity" through mortgage payments by the trustee, the court did
not speculate whether such an arrangement would constitute an
"equity" under § 162(a) (3). Id. at 61-11. The taxpayer whose
trustee makes mortgage payments might also be subject to taxation
on the amounts so applied as income under § 677(a) of the Code.
See note 33 infra. For a discussion of the possible tax consequences
of a short-term trust assuming the grantor's mortgage payments, see
Tax Consequences of Gifts of Encumbered Property In Trust, 8 REAL
PROPERTY, PROBATE & TRUSTS J. 371 (Fall 1973).
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a present "equity" in the taxpayer would not have altered this
comparison. The benefits the taxpayer receives by virtue of his
reversionary interest accrue to him regardless of whether he makes
rental payments to the trustee. Clearly, had the taxpayer placed
his property in trust and proceeded to lease equivalent property
for his business from a third party, the same benefits associated
with his reversionary interest would have inured to him. When
the taxpayer rents the trust property instead, his rental payments
secure no more benefits than he already had. He cannot be said
to be increasing his ownership interest through his payments to
the trustee. Likewise, there remains the impracticality of distinguishing the gift and leaseback lessee from other lessees with remainder or reversionary interests. These other lessees have a similar accrual of benefits independent of the rentals paid and would
also be denied a deduction even though they have received no par32
ticular tax benefit from their rental arrangements.
Assuming that the Mathews approach to the equity provision
is accepted by other courts, the taxpayer ought to be aware that
retaining a reversionary interest may still be a risky tax maneuver.
The gift and leaseback plan as a whole must provide that effective
control of the trust property has been relinquished to the trustee.
The Mathews' inquiry into control was quite cursory and apparently did not include the taxpayer's reversion as a factor to be
considered.3 3 Other courts may not be as willing, however, to pass
over the practical significance of the reversion. When the taxpayer retains a reversion, there is one less change in his position
to which the court may look in support of the bona fides of the
transaction. Given the short duration of the trust, and the possible close relationship of the taxpayer, trustee and beneficiaries,
a court might find, as a practical matter, when the taxpayer has
become a major beneficiary by retaining a reversionary interest,
the property has been managed for the taxpayer in exactly the
same way he would have managed it for himself. On this basis,
the court could hold that the entire transaction lacked "economic
reality" and was a nullity for tax purposes. 34 Alternatively, the
32. For example, the rents made by a remainderman to a life tenant
may be applied toward repairs and insurance, while the property may
appreciate in value during the rental period. For tax purposes a line
might be drawn between a lessee whose future interest is voluntarily
created by the lessee himself, and one whose interest derives from
some other source. Under such a rule, however, a taxpayer who conveyed a life estate while retaining a reversion would still be precluded from deducting any rental payments made to the life tenant.
33. P-H TAx CT. REP. & Mm. Dsc. 1 61.3, at 61-7, -11 (1973).

34. See Irvine K. Furman, 45 T.C. 360, affd per curiam, 381 F.2d 22 (5th
Cir. 1967).

TAXATION
court could hold that the taxpayer with a reversion, as the effective owner of the trust property, does not need to make rental
payments, and thereby fails to meet the "ordinary and necessary"
requirement of section 162 (a).35
CONCLUSION
The Tax Court in C. James Mathews 36 became the first court
to examine in detail whether a reversion is an "equity" under section 162 (a) (3) of the Code, sufficient in itself to disallow rental
payments made in conjunction with a gift and leaseback. Other
courts may approve its holding that such a reversion is not a disqualifying "equity," if they foresee undesirable effects on other lessees with reversions or remainders should the gift and leaseback
lessee be denied a deduction. At the same time, the taxpayer who
retains a reversion may be inviting a court to conclude that his
rental payments are not "ordinary and necessary" or that his trust
transaction as a whole is an economic nullity which may not be
recognized for tax purposes. Because of these uncertainties, the
taxpayer setting up a gift and leaseback would be best advised
to avoid creating a reversion whenever possible.
Roberta L. Cook '75
35. See Van Zandt v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 440 (5th Cir. 1965).
36. P-H TAx CT. REP. & MiEm. DEc. 1 61.3, at 61-7 (1973).

